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Cert to CA (Heaney, Peck~ ~
Henley, issenting in part ~

UNITED STATES

v.
KNOTTS

Federal/Criminal

~
Timely

'------

- -

NOTE: This case is "curve-lined"
_ _ _ . . with No. 81-6089, Petschen
v. United States, in which a Preliminary Memorandum has already
circulated.

The two petitions arise from the same CAS decision,

and the operative facts are the same.
SUMMARY: The issue is whether the warrantless use of an
electronic "beeper" to locate a can of chloroform transported to
resp's property violated the Fourth Amendment.
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FACTS: Petr and his co-defendant, Petschen, were part of an
enterprise engaged in the manufacture of amphetamine.

Police

suspicion focused on the group's "chemist," Armstrong, due to his
pilferage of "drug-precursor chemicals" from the 3M Co., his
former employer.

Further investigation indicated that Armstrong

was involved in illicit drug manufacturing, and had been placing
numerous orders for chemicals with the Hawkins Chemical Co. in
Minneapolis.
On Feb. 28, 1980, with the consent of Hawkins Chemical Co.,
police agents attached an electronic beeper to a can of
chlorofoJm which Armstrong was scheduled to pick up from the
company later that day.

Armstrong picked up the chloroform and

other chemicals as expected, and later transferred the chemicals
to Petschen's car.

Agents followed Petschen as he drove into

Wisconsin, but lost sight of the car when Petschen began driving
evasively.

The agents also lost the beeper signal for about half

an hour, but the signal was later picked up by a helicopter and
the can of chloroform was determined to be on property
surrounding a remote cabin owned by resp.

The next day, resp and

Knotts were observed leaving the property.
~

Based on this information, Minn. and federal agents obtained
a warrant to search the cabin and surrounding property.

They

discovered a clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin, and seized
chemicals and equipment.

The can of chloroform, on which the

beeper had been placed, was found hidden under a wooden barrel
outside the cabin.
The DC (D. Minn., J. Alsop) denied a motion to suppress the
evidence seized from the cabin.

Resp and Petschen were both

I

- 3 -

convicted of conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in
violation of 21

u.s.c.

§§

S4l{a) {1)

&

S46.

HOLDING BELOW: The CAS reversed resp's conviction, although
it affirmed the conviction of his codefendant, Petschen.

Noting

that other CAs had reached varying results regarding Fourth
Amendment restrictions on the use of beepers to trace personalty
other than motor vehicles, the CAS held that law enforcement
officers must obtain a warrant before using a beeper to determine
the location of noncontraband materials that have been placed in
a private area or withdrawn from public view.

See United States

v. Bailey, 62S F.2d 93S, 944 {CA6 19SO); United States v. Moore,
56 2 F • 2d 1 0 6 , 113 {CA 1 19 7 7 ) , c e r t den i e d , 4 3 5 U• S • 9 26 {19 7 S ) .
Resp's cabin was a secluded and private area, and the chloroform
drum was placed out of sight.

As the owner and resident of the

property, resp had "a reasonable, legitimate expectation of
privacy in · the

location of objects out of public view on his

land," and the warrantless use of the tracing beeper thus
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

However, because Petschen

could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the equipment
of a clandestine drug laboratory on his coconspirator's property,
the seized evidence was admissible against him.
Judge Henley dissented in part.

He maintained that the use

of a beeper to monitor the location of a precursor chemical-which, although not itself contraband, is clearly intended for
use in the illegal manufacture of controlled substances--does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.

See United States v. Perez, 526

F.2d S59, S63 {CAS), cert denied, 429

u.s. S46 {1976).

CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that this case presents an
important question of Fourth Amendment law and that there is a

- 4 -

direct conflict with decisions of the CAs 9 & 10.

E.g., United

States v. Dubrofsky, 5Sl F.2d 20S (CA9 197S): United States v.
Clayborne, 5S4 F.2d 346, 350-351 (CAlO 197S).

These decisions

hold that, because beeper monitoring is merely an aid to visual
surveillance and the intrusion occasioned by such monitoring is
slight, beeper surveillance may be undertaken without a warrant.
Cf. Moore and Bailey, supra, which reached a contrary conclusion.
The decision below goes beyond Moore and Bailey, which involved
the warrantless use of a beeper over an extended period to
ascertain the continued presence of chemicals inside private
premises.

The CAS in this case held that the beeper could not be

employed even to determine the arrival of the chloroform on
resp's property: this conflicts with other CA decisions holding
that the warrantless monitoring of a beeper to follow the
movements of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

E.g., United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (CAS 1979): United
States v. Michael, ·645 F.2d 252 (CAS 19Sl)

(en bane), cert denied

sub nom. Michael v. United States, No. Sl-112 (Oct. 19,
19Sl) (Justice White, with Justices Brennan and Powell,
dissenting).

The decision below is also inconsistent with Smith

v. Maryland, 442

u.s.

735 (1979), which upheld the warrantless

use of a "pen register" to record the numbers dialed from a
defendant's telephone.
DISCUSSION: As the SG points out, there is a CA conflict
concerning the validity of warrantless beeper surveillance.
Although the Court recently denied cert in a similar case-Michael v. United States, supra--this is an issue that the Court
will probably have to take eventually.

The legality of the

installation of the beeper--at issue in some of the other CA

I

-
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cases--is not in dispute here, since the CAB held that attachment
with the consent of 1 the Hawkins Chemical Co. was proper.
However, the Court may nevertheless want to grant, to consider
the constitutionality of warrantless beeper monitoring.
I recommend calling for a response with a view toward
granting.
The right to respond has been waived.

May 12, 1982

Rosenblum

'

.

Opns in petn

The response does little to change
the posture of the case as revealed
by the petitions. There is a conflict
over the main issue presented:
whether the Fourth Amendment forbids
warrantless "beel_>er" surveillance.
Because of tlie 1m{>ortance of this
'issue, I would Grant and Consolidate
these two curve-lined cases arising
from
the same set of facts, Nos.
) 81-1802
and 81-6089. '

•

The one disadvantage of these cases
is that there is here no 4th Amendment
issue about the "installation" of
the beeper. It was installed into a
can , with the Rermission of the can's
owner. Tfie Fourth TmendmenE question
tnus arose only when the can was
moved onto the defendants' property.
As the more typical beeper case may
involve direct installation of the
beeper into property of the defendant
himself, it arguably would be worth
waiting for such a case. You certainly
should consider this possibility.
Because of the importance of the issue,
however, it would be my inclination to
GRANT these cases now and CONSOLIDATE
them for argument.
,
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-1802:
United States v. Knotts
From:

Mark

December 3, 1982

Question Presented
Whether warrantless monitoring of a beeper placed in noncontraband violates the Fourth Amendment.

,l}

)',

2.

I. Background
A. Facts
On June 14, 1979,
the

3M Company

a state narcotics agent was informed by

that Tristan Armstrong, one of

resp's codefen-

dants, had been stealing phenylacetone and other chemicals that
are

"precursors"

phetamine

and

(starter materials}

methamphetamine.

in the manufacture of am-

Through

visual

surveillance,

agents saw codefendant Darryl Petschen and others moving laboratory equipment and furniture from a residence in St. Paul, Minn.,
into a truck.
the

A search of the vacated residence, conducted with

landlord's

permission,

revealed

laboratory

equipment

and

traces of a white powder that contained a byproduct of the amphetamine synthesis.
The agents later learned that Armstrong had been ordering
chemicals

from

the Hawkins

conducted visual

Chemical

Co.

in Minneapolis.

surveillance as Armstrong

picked

They

up boxes of

-

chemicals from the company and took them to Petschen's house in
Minneapolis.

There the chemicals were transferred to Petschen's

car, which Petschen then drove to a farmhouse in Scandia, Minn.
On

February

28,

1980,

Armstrong was scheduled to pick up

another order of chemicals,

including a quantity of chloroform,

from Hawkins Chemical Co.

The company permitted the state agents

to place the chloroform in a special five-gallon drum containing
an electronic signal transmitter -- a "beeper" -- hidden in the
bottom.

On

the delivery date,

v"

the agents

used

the beeper and

visual surveillance to follow the progress of the drum.
Armstrong took the packages of chemicals to Petschen's resi-

3.

dence

in the

city, where they were put in Petschen' s car.

An

hour and a half later Petschen left, drove to his farmhouse in
Scandia,

~

~

then twenty minutes

into Wisconsin.

later

During this time,

resumed

driving

the agents

and

l}..ea ~ed

kept ~ termittent

visual surveillance of the car, relying on the beeper to stay in

~ continuous

contact.

maneuvers.

At some point Petschen began making evasive

The agents terminated their visual surveillance, then

lost the signal.

One hour later -- two hours after Petschen left

-

the farmhouse -- a heliocopter located the beeper signal in the
vicinity of

a

........,

cabin occupied by

Lake, Wisconsin.

resp

Leroy Knotts

near

Shell

The agents established intermittent visual sur-

veillance of the property until the following day, when they saw
resp and Petschen leave in Petschen's vehicle.
Three days later federal and state agents executed warrants
authorizing them to search Petschen's farmhouse and Knotts' cabin
and surrounding property.

They discovered a fully operable drug

laboratory behind wall paneling in

K~f cabin.

In the labora-

tory were forumlae for amphetamine and methamphetamine, $10,000
worth of equipment, and chemicals sufficient to produce 14 pounds
of pure amphetamine.

The agents found the five-gallon drum hid-

den under a barrel outside the cabin.

B. Decisions Below
Armstrong, Petschen, and resp were indicted on various drug
charges.

Armstrong pleaded guilty and testified against the oth-

er two.
Prior

to

trial

resp moved to suppress the evidence found

I

4.

during the search of his cabin on the ground that the warrant was
invalid because based on information derived from the warrantless
use of the beeper.
tion.

The v6c

Pet. App. at 12a.

(D.

Minn~

Alsop, J.)

denied the mo-

It held that the company's consent val-

idated the installation of the beeper, and that resp "could not
~-------------~---------------------~~
reasonably have expected to keep private the fact that the can
had arrived at his residence."
original) .

Pet. App. at 15a-16a (emphasis in

Resp and Petschen were convicted.

to five years.

Resp was sentenced

C. A i' "-_.~- /J

v

A divided CAS panel reversed resp's conviction.

~~

PeL1pp . ~

Judge Peck [CA6], joined by Judge Heaney, agreed with the ~-

at la.

DC that the beeper's installation was valid, stating "Caveat emp-----~.-.

tor."

Id. at n.2.

~

..._.....-.~

He then distinguished cases involving beepers

on cars or in contraband, finding that "it would be a limitless

expansion of police power to allow warrantless tracking of
goods wherever an illicit use was suspected."
that

the

beeper

had passed

The ~
~
public

Id. at Sa.

crucial point was

lawfu~

from

the

sphere to the private sphere:
When police agents track bugged personal property without first obtaining a warrant, they
must do so at the risk that this enhanced surveillance, intrusive at best, might p ush fortuitously and unreasonably into the
rivate
s ere protec e
our
men en t.
It
so 1n
1s case, where t e eeper's signal
was lost and found again only after the
beeper-laden drum was on private property out
of public view.
(Pet. App. at 6a-7a.)
Although
was

resp' s

upheld

conviction was

because Vpetschen had

reversed,

Petschen' s

no standing

conviction

to object

to

the

search of Knotts' cabin.
Judge Henley dissented from the reversal of resp's convic-

50

tion.

He objected primarily to the majority's

inflexible dis-

tinction between contraband and noncontraband, arguing that the
rationale underlying the contraband exception applies as well to
these precursor chemicals:

"[W]hen chemicals are purchased for

such intended illegal use, the familiar warning cited by the rnajority in note 2, caveat emptor, might be well-taken."
at

In addition,

lOa.

Pet. App.

v-

he noted that these precursor chemicals

-

were subject to forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act,
21

u.s.c.

---.........

§881, a further indication that resp lacked a reason-

able expectation of privacy in them.
The Court granted cert to resolve a
CAs.
6089.

~n

The Court denied Petschen's petition

the

or cert in No. 81-

There are no amicus briefs.

II. Discussion
This

is a vexing case.

I

have spent what probably is an

inordinate amount of time on it, yet have been unable to satisfy
~-

myself that I have reached the proper conclusion.

~r ~ at:_ lea~t se~ forth ~eful

~·

I hope this

analytical framewo.rk.

is that the Government should be required, absent exigent circurn-

~tances,

to obtain a warrant prior to using a beeper.

~~~
dofesthis

Court's cases,

~:~

constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

P-

My view

however,

suggests

that

My reading

use of a beeper

A. Installing the Beeper
A threshold issue that sometimes arises in this type of case
is whether the installation of the beeper was valid.

The issue

t~,~~~~,h

ftv_~~ttf~

e

6.

~~%;/ ~-~-~~~.dA-

is

not

raised

here

because

the

chemical company consented

to

~

J-£t_
Su~h

placement of the beeper in the drum.

third-party

normally is obtained when the Government places a

___........,

.........--....

.......__

consent ~

beeper

--

in a Uc•4~,_

bee~
€1

particular object.
The other usual mode of installing a
___________,
<.
is to place it on a moving vehicle. Most CAs have held that in- ~

stallation of a beeper in these circumstances does not contravene ~
~1

See Brief for US at 13 n.6 (citing cases). ~

the Fourth Amendment.

There are no decipions on the validity of placement of a beeper
on a person, nor any decisions dealing with illegal entry to install a beeper.
For present purposes, the only important point is that the

~

~

~f-

~

third-party consent does not affect the remainder of the analy----------~~--------sis. Even if the Government obtained consent from the owner of a

--

pay telephone to install a recording device, the decision in Katz

,. _ ;r v.
\,L.; --tt'r

J',

~

United States,

389

u.s.

347

(1968), still would protect the

phone user's expectation of privacy.
JP. sue here

j/t£11""'

is ~ab~~ o :_ resp's

Gover ~
a~d.

Similarly, the central is- ~~

not

expectation that

u ~eepers ~follow h~m

the

and his prope_; ty

The chemical company could not consent to the continuing

"search" that allegedly occurred once the property containing the
beeper was transferred to the purchaser.

B. Does the Fourth Amendment Apply?

There are two major issues:
a

"search" at all under

[Tw-o ~ ~
(1) whether use of a beeper is

the Fourth Amendment, and,

whether a warrant must be obtained to use the beeper.
the first issue here, and the second issue in part C.

if so,

(2)

I discuss

~

~)15:(~

Judge

Henley's

dissent · correctly

~at

observed

in these cases:

CAs

have

"One analysis fo-

item containing the beeper.

Under

1tems may generally be monitored in public places,
but monitoring may be prohibited after
from public view.
item

containing

the i terns are withdrawn
f the

Another analysis focuses on th
the

beeper.

items may be monitored regardless of location, whereas most noncontraband items may be monitored ' under the former analysis only
if they are in a public location."
use these analyses for

p~rposes

Pet. App. at 8a-9a.

I will

of discussion, though I will ar-

gue that both are dubious.
1. The NATURE of the Item Containing the Beeper
Several CAs have placed significance on the

~4:ype

(1) ~ontraband,

to which a beeper may be attached:

v('
~vehicles, and (3) lawfully-possessed property.

of objec t
(2) moving

For present pur-

poses, the important distinction is between contraband and other
property .

......,

N~

CA has held that monitoring a beeper placed in con-

traband violates the Fourth Amendment.
v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (CAS 1976)

See, e.g., United States

(beeper in money stolen from

bank); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (CA9 1978)
er in heroin).

(beep-

The basic rationale is that no one may have a

~)1.
~

reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
There

is

no dispute that the chloroform contained in

five-gallon drum was not technically contraband.
was not per se unlawful.

'14..-1>

t~

Its possession

But Judge Henley argued that the ratio-

nales underlying the contraband exception apply as well to "chem-

8
icals

intended

for

Pet. App. at lOa.

use

in

the

manufacture

of

0

illegal drugs."

He noted that the chloroform was an essential

precursor to the manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Moreover,

the Controlled Substances Act,

provides for
use"

21

u.s.c.

forfeiture of any "raw material .

in manufacturing controlled substances.

.

§88l(a) (2),
intended for

In Judge Henley's

view, these considerations clearly diminished resp's expectation
of privacy with respect to the chloroform.

The Government had

probable cause to believe that the chloroform was "intended for
use"

in illegal drug manufacturing, and under the statute could

have seized the chloroform without a warrant.
This

argument

should be rejected.

is

somewhat

attractive,

but

I

believe

it

First, difficult line-drawing problems will

develop if the test is the likelihood that certain property will
be used in a criminal endeavor.

For example, where a doctor or

chemist might have a legitimate reason to purchase certain chemicals, it may be difficult to say whether the chemicals were intended for illegal use.

Furthermore, the very focus on the exis-

tence of probable cause to believe criminal activity is occuring
suggests that without probable cause the police cannot act, which
in turn means there is a search taking place.

Thus, the probable

criminal purpose for the chemicals relates not to the existence
of a protected Fourth Amendment privacy interest, but the sufficiency of the Government's reasons for overriding that interest.
Second,

there

are

difficult

analytical

problems with

~~~-----------------------------

-

the

statement that "no one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in

-----

contraband."

An individual's expectation of privacy is not sim-

~

9.
ply in a particular piece of property.

If

the police without )

probable cause break into someone's home and discover heroi,n, the (
heroin will be suppressed even though it is contraband.

~

The same

holds for contraband discovered during an unlawful search of a
person or car or suitcase or any other location in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

~

~d

It is not the Jcon-

in which the person has a privacy interest, but

II

r ~er

"'-

the places in which he might keep the contraband or any object.

~

in this case the expectation of privacy relates

This expectation seems the same regardless whether the beeper is
placed on his person, car, or lawful property or whether it is

~

fei ture,

therefore,

Even if the chloroform was subject to forthat

fact

would

not

affect

the

question

whether the police may use a beeper without regard to the Fourth
Amendment.
I recognize that there is historical support for the contraband distinction, but I always have had difficulty with it.

One

as easily could say that resp had no reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy in a cabin that presumably served primarily or exclusively as a clandestine laboratory for manufacturing
illegal drugs.

Cf.

Pet.

App.

at

9a

(Henley,

J.,

dissenting).

Yet the Court consistently has rejected the view that the conduct
of illegal activity on searched premises defeats the occupant's
in those premises.
the Item Containin
The

-~''
~

~

t~~

person's movements and to the location of items at his residence.

placed in contraband.

~

the Bee er

analysis, used by the court below and the

lj-t!-~~~~

if-6

~ ~~ ~ 10.
"~--'~~.....,.....,..-4~~1r.~~~....-"'- e)GSS JJ& ~1-<J ~~

parties here,
beeper

is

suggests that the critical question is where the

located

while

being monitored.

In

~

particular,

question is whether the beeper is in "public" or "private."

-tn!f lrY

This analysis begins with the undisputed assertion that

t~,

Fourth Amendment does not apply to visual surveillance of a person,

a vehicle, or other object.

public,

When a person moves about in

in a car or otherwise, he has no reasonable expectation

that this movements will be unobserved.

"What a person knowingly

exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

This principle generally applies even where the Government
use of "sense-enhancing" devices such as radar,

makes

~~

binoculars, and

.....

~

~

tracking dogs.

From this the SG argues that use of a beeper to follow the
movements of a vehicle does not constitute a search because no
expectation of privacy is at stake.
wise:

"We .

~.
a~

. agree that the warrantless use of a beep§.f to

.
.
1
ass1st~
~~

defendant's

Resp does not contend other-

s qrve~'11 ance

Fourth

of

Amendment

anot h er
rights."

-----------~----------------

per~on

Brief

d oes not v1o
. 1 ate

for

Resp

at

18.

Resp does contend, however, that monitoring a beeper that is on
private premises implicate the Fourth Amendment.

The CAS

major- ~

ity emphasized that here "the beeper's signal was lost and found
again only after the beeper-laden drum was on .E_r ivate property
out of public view."

Pet. App. at 7a.

-

Resp also draws this dis-

tinction between the valid use of beepers for "surveillance assistance" and their invalid use for "location monitoring," i.e.,
a beeper "to determine the (continued) presence of property

11.
which it is lawful to possess."

Brief for Resp at 25.

I do not think this distinction easily can be maintained.
To be sure, it always is plausible under the Fourth Amendment to
suggest a
locations.

distinction between intrusions of public and private
The prevailing analysis focuses on "reasonable expec-

tations of privacy," and such expectations generally are greater
in a private place such as a home than in a more public place
such as a
Fourth

Few would suggest that the police violate the

car.

Amendment

by

using

binoculars

to

identify

persons

or

activities in an automobile in public, yet a violation may occur
if binoculars are used to peer into a private home.
States v.

Taborda,

635 F.2d 131

(CA2 1980)

Cf. United

(warrantless use of

telescope to identify objects in suspect's apartment violates the
Fourth Amendment, where the objects otherwise would not have been
identifiable to the public) •
Resp raises an analogous argument here.

Where the police

conduct surveillance through a beeper, they simply are using
electronic means of doing what they could do visually.

an~

But when

the police monitor the location of property (or presumably a person)

on private premises, they are using the beeper to do what

they otherwise could not do without a search warrant:
the premises to see if certain items are inside.
ceive of cases

in which this might be true.

"enter"

One can con-

For example,

the

police might place beepers in every drum of chemicals sold, not
to follow a particular purchaser to a destination, but to allow
the police to scan a large number of buildings to see if any of
the drums ended up there.

~

12.
The

problem

monitoring"

is

that

distinction

this

breaks

"visual
down

surveillance"/"location

in

practice.

A beeper's

fundamental use is for tracking particular persons or items to a
final resting point.
vate

property.

Usually this resting point will be on pri-

Whether

one

calls

this

"surveillance"

or

a

determination of "location," the SG is correct that "ascertaining
the destination" of the vehicle or
the exercise."

pa ~kage

"is the whole point of

Brief for US at 35.

----=::>

In this case,

for example, the Government's purpose was to

locate the clandestine laboratory.

It would seem to matter lit-

tle as a practical matter whether the state agents were monitoring the beeper at the precise moment the car arrived at the cabin, or whether they temporarily lost the signal and rediscovered
it only after the drum containing the beeper had come to rest out
of public view.
that the

intrusion on resp's privacy was greater in the latter

situation.
cided.

It would be a fine distinct ion indeed to say

Yet this is precise basis on which this case was de-

Resp and the CAS appear to concede that had the agents

been tracking the beeper when it turned onto resp's property, the
discovery of

the destination would have been valid

for

use in

obtaining a search warrant.
I

do not believe that the fortuity of whether the police

happened to lose the beeper signal shortly before Petschen's car
arrived at the cabin has any reasonable relationship to the existence of an intrusion on resp's Fourth Amendment expectations.

I

therefore would not adopt a rule distinguishing between monitoring

..---of

"public"

and

"private" places

for purposes of deciding
·.·

13.

whether the monitoring constituted a search.
purpose of

the

beeper monitoring

persons or items have gone.

is

In either case the

to discover where certain

If the use of the beeper is not a

search for purposes of "surveillance assistance," then it is not
a search for the related purpose of "location monitoring."
3. Beepers and "Expectations of Privacy" in the
Movement and Location of Persons or Property
In my view, the case turns on the validity of the SG's proposition that use of a beeper to follow someone's public movements
does not constitute a search.

If this proposition is true, then

------------------------------

beepers do not fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
As noted above,
persuasive.
,.

When a

the SG's argument is quite simple -- and
beeper

is

-

-

used to track a ' 'i:>erson' ;! _g ublic

. ,...., ,
1 ocat1on, 1t simply provides a _more efficient means of doing what
~

the Government might do through visual surveillance or other "enhancement"

devices such as bloodhounds or binoculars.

person's location generally is "knowingly expose[d]

Since a

to the pub-

lic," Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, the beeper does not impinge on any
privacy interests that visual surveillance does not.
This argument has powerful support in the type of analysis
employed in

~ th

participate) .

v. Maryland,

442 U.S 735

(1979)

(you did not

Justice Blackmun held for the Court that use of a

pen register -- a device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone, but does not monitor the contents of the communication
-- was not a search under

the Fourth Amendment.

The arguments

adopted by the Court are relevant here.
First, the Court noted that the intrusion was minimal, since

...

.
14.
the communications of the contents were not disclosed.

A similar

argument is made here that all the beeper says is "here I am."
The beeper tells nothing else about what private activity is going on.

(Note, however, that there is a type of beeper -- not at

issue here-- that signals when a package has been opened.)
ond,

the Court found that the phone user knowingly exposed the

numbers

dialed

either

to

an

operator

or

company's capacity for routine monitoring.
the risk of disclosure to the police.
here that when a

to

the

telephone

He therefore assumed

A similar argument is made

person moves about in public, he assumes the

risk that his whereabouts will be observed by the police.
ly,

Sec-

Final-

the Smith Court rejected the argument that since the phone

company did not in fact routinely record the numbers of the type
of local call that Smith had made, he had a legitimate expecta/

tion of privacy.

It sufficed that the phone company could have

recorded the information.

Similarly, the SG argues that it does

not matter, as the CAS thought it did,

that the police did not

actually see Petschen's car arrive at resp's cabin.

Since the

police could have watched the car arrive, resp "could not reasonably have expected to keep private the fact that the can had arrived at his residence."

Pet. App. at 15a-16a (DC opinion)

(ern-

phasis in original).
In short, the SG has persuasive arguments that under existing precedent monitoring a beeper simply enhances lawful methods
I

of surveillance and thus does not constitute a search.
less, a strong counterargument is possible.

Nonethe-

Quite candidly, this

counterargument is premised primarily on the very efficiency of a

15.
beeper and the chi 11 ing prospects of its wide spread use by the
Government.

A Court holding that monitoring a beeper does not

implicate the Fourth Amendment would mean that the Government may

------------------------------beepers
on
anyone
for

use

any

reason.

Any

--------------~------------

unsuspectingly might carry around a beeper placed,
shoe.

;7 ~

individual
say,

in his

Evidence of involvement in criminal activity would not be

required prior to use of the beeper.

This unrestrained power may

implicate the privacy concerns that arise from the Fourth Amendment.
The broadest possible argument against the unrestrained use ~
of

beepers

is

stated

in

Judge

Keith's

concurring

opinion

~

United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (CA6 1980):
I would hold that privacy of movement itself
is deserving of Fourth Amendment protections.
A meaningful definition of privacy should include the control of the intimacies of personal identity.
Obviously this control begins
with one's body and at the very least extends
to those elements which constitute one's existence as a sentient being.
In this regard, I
think an individual may legitimately expect to
live in this society without fear that the
government may be silently following his every
movement.
Sometimes we do not care if others
know where we go or what we do.
If someone
follows us to work or to the grocery store, we
may not be concerned.
But each of us goes
places and does things that we would prefer to
keep private.
Ordinarily we can protect our
privacy by insuring that we are not being followed, and that others do not know where we
are going. The beeper destroys our ability to
protect the privacy of our movement.
(6 28
F.2d at 949 (emphasis in original).)
This

position

is

too broad.

It would call

in ~~~

·~-~

~

into question

even the use of ordinary visual surveillance by the police, at
least where the person exhibited some sign that he did not wish
to be followed.

Cf. Note, Tracking Katz:

Beepers, Privacy, and

16.
the Fourth Amendment, 86 Yale L.J. 1461, 1494 n.l45
gues for a

right of privacy in movement,

(1977}

(ar-

then states that this

"suggests that even long-term visual surveillance may result in a
search subject to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements."}
would be

fairly

disastrous

for

It

the Court to adopt a theory of

privacy that might raise in every case the question whether the
person's public activities were protected under the Fourth Amendment.
/I

It

is possible,

however,

to articulate a different theory

that emphasizes the very efficiency with which a beeper enables
the Government to keep track of someone, and thus would not extend

to ordinary means of

The courts that have

surveillance.

adopted this view generally have argued that although a person in
public has no reasonable expectation of going unobserved, he may
well expect that there is no special means of tailing him.
United States v.

Moore,

562 F.2d 106, 112

(CAl 1977}

Cf.

("While a

driver has no claim to be free from observation while driving in
public, he properly can expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device that continuously signals his presence."}
This emphasis on subjective expectations, of course, somewhat begs the question whether his expectation is reasonable.
the

If

law determines that the use of beepers is unobjectionable,

then the expectation can be ignored.
circularity,
"normative

the

issue

inquiry,"

Because of this problem of

ultimately must be determined through a

Smith v.

Maryland,

442 U.S.

at 740 n.5.,

into the legitimacy of these privacy expectations -- what society
is prepared to say should be expected.

The argument here is that

17.
society is not prepared to expect that personal public movements
may

be

subjected

to

pervasive

monitoring

through

electronic

surveillance devices.
Concedely,
tion.

there is not much authority for such a proposi-

The most analogous argument was presented in Justice Har-

lan's dissent in United States v. White, 401

u.s.

745 (1971).

In

;{!~~
~

that case the Court upheld a conviction based on testimony by
government agents who, without a warrant, listened to statements
made by the defendant to an informer wearing a microphone.
informer
agents.)

could not

be

located,

necessitating

testimony by

(The
the

In a dissent based largely on concerns about the rise

of the "Orwellian Big Brother,"

id.

at 770, Justice Harlan ex-

pressed concern that warrantless third-party bugging might "undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one
another

that

is characteristic of

tween citizens of a free society."

individual
Id. at 787.

relationships beHe believed that

there were crucial differences between testimony by the informant
and third-party monitoring.
My analysis is similar, though I do not suggest that Justice
Harlan necessarily was correct in White.

Justice White's plural-

ity opinion in White reasonably argued that it was unlikely that

~

a

person engaged in criminal activities "would distinguish be-

J.o

tween probable informers on the one hand and probable informers ~~
with transmitters on the other."

Id.

at 752.

In other words,

the danger of permitting warrantless recording by an informer was
quite limited; the informer still had to get the person to talk
directly to him.

The same would be true if a person's traveling

18.
companion wore a beeper.

Since the person "consents" to his com-

panion's continuous knowledge of his location, warrantless use of
the beeper, like use of the transmitting device in White, would
be permissible.

The potential for harassment through such a use

of beepers is limited because the informant has to obtain this
"consent" to travel with the person.
Beepers

normally

are

not

traveling with the suspect.

used,

however,

by

an

informant

In the usual case, where there is

"consent" to continuous knowledge of one's whereabouts,
Justice Harlan's analysis has
merit.
._,_
----------------~

recognize

that electronic

I

no ~

thl.nk

~

I certainly do not wish to

tracking devices may be anywhere and

therefore that it is unreasonable to expect that my public movements will not be monitored.

Yet under the SG's view, there is

no limitation on the use of beepers.

The police may use

beepers ~

on any person or property for any reason and for any length of
time.

The potential for harassment is substantial.

basic reaction,
reluctant

I

to hold

believe,
that

It is this

that explains why most CAs have been

use

of

a

beeper

is entirely free

from

Fourth Amendment constraints.
In response the SG notes that this position "reflects the
view that our governmental institutions are incapable of controlling abuses of police activities if those activities are not held
to be subject to
[This]

judicial scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.

exceedingly pessimistic vision

.

is far removed from

the realities of contemporary American society."

us

at 5.

~

Reply Brief for

This is a fair statement, but I am of the view that the

Fourth Amendment exists to protect privacy interests that other-

19.
wise might go unprotected in the legislative process.
A more telling response,
Amendment decisions

however,

is that in prior Fourth

this Court has refused to use hypothetical

police abuses as a reason for invalidating a warrantless surveillance practice.

The SG is correct that

the

"danger of abuse"

type of argument sketched out above was made by Justice Marshall
in dissent in Smith v. Maryland and by Justice Brennan in dissent
in United States v.

Miller,

425

U.S.

435

(1976)

(Powell,

J.)

(holding that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
bank records) .
A related response is that the proper remedy for this kind
of invasion of privacy, which realistically differs from a traditiona!

"search,"

is

an

action

for

damages

and an

injunction.

This was the view of Chief Judge Clark, joined by other judges,
concurring in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252

(CAS 1981)

(en bane) :
Calling the attachment of a beeper to an automobile a search creates confusion at the outset -- it is neither a search nor a seizure.
As importantly, extending the illogic of the
exclusionary rule (which punishes society for
the transgressions of errant police) to nonsearch situations puts undue pressure on the
courts to infringe the core right at issue -the right to privacy. Where no search or seizure is involved, pol ice a5r fagemen t of the
r1ghF to privacy should be rectified as other
similar constitutional infringements are
through a private action against the errant
officer.
(645 F.2d at 259-60.)
This is a reasonable argument, though I would note that it rests
predominantly on the view that all Fourth Amendment violations
properly are remedied through a lawsuit rather than through the
exclusionary rule.

20.
The only analogous

example of which I

am aware is a case

used in first-year criminal law, Giancana v.
366

(CA7

1964).

Giancana,

The

FBI

a reputed mobster.

conducted

Johnson,

24-hour

335 F.2d

surveillance

on

For example, two to five cars al-

ways were outside his home to maintain surveillance or follow him
around.
for

He brought suit under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments

infringement of his rights to privacy and liberty.

The DC

granted a preliminary injunction (which required inter alia that
"at least one foursome intervene between plaintiff and FBI agents
the action
-in controversyTheunderCA7 28dismissed
U.S.C. §1331.
But

when plaintiff plays golf"
for

lack of $10,000

the point

is

that

I

this

(!)).

presumably is the type of

remedy that

might serve as a bulwark against the systematic and continuous
use of beepers for purposes of harassment.

And it also preserves

the position that visual surveillance is not a search and thus
does not require a warrant.

~

After weighing all of these arguments and counterarguments,

~

the decision seems to come down to a choice between two very dif-

&~~

ferent ways of looking at this situation.
since

~n

has no expectation of privacy in his

erty's A movem~n ~s,

- --A"'r___......

~

The ~ is tha.!ie~,.
~r

his prop-

use of a beeper cannot be called a search.

The

~is that whatever the general lack of expectation of privacy in public movements, people should not have to live with the
risk that an electronic beeper may be used by the police as a
means of pervasive and silent surveillance.

Therefore, use of a

beeper should be deemed a search.
Writing on a clean slate, I would opt for the latter view.

21.
I share Justice Harlan's concerns about the "Orwellian Big Brother."

The efficiency and secrecy with which electronic devices

may be used are, in my view, powerful reasons for limiting their
use to cases where the Government has

a

justifiable basis for

believing that crimes are being committed.

Reasonable arguments

may be made that this problem should be dealt with by legislation
or by private lawsuit brought under other constitutional amendments, but I think the Fourth Amendment's traditional protection
of personal privacy would make its application proper here.
Under

this Court's

cases,

however,

I

think

the SG should

~---------------------prevail.
The Government's ability to discover the
f"

identity of

7"

the persons to whom one has made phone calls is at least as intrusive on privacy as the Government's ability to follow a person (
~

or his property from one location to another.

~-

Yet the Court in ~J

Smith v. Maryland accepted the Government's arguments about the
limited nature of

the intrusion and the lack of any precisely

defined expectation of privacy, while rejecting the individual's
arguments

about

the

danger

electronic surveillance.

of

governmental

abuse

of means of

A similar balancing was made in favor

of the Government in your opinion in United States v. Miller.
And the Court in United States v. White rejected Justice Harlan's
view that electronic surveillance, because of its unique character,

should

be

treated

as

invading

privacy even where

means of surveillance would not invade that same privacy.
these decisions,

the SG

s~

normal

-

Under

correct that a beeper merely en-

hances the Government's ability to conduct visual surveillance,
which

invades

no

reasonable

expectation

of

privacy

and

which

~

1'3;?W

'
wg.
~

22.
therefore is not a search.

C. Need for a Warrant
If monitoring a beeper is a search, there remains the question whether

a

warrant

is

required.

Some CAs have

held

that

since the intrusion on privacy is limited, the Fourth Amendment
is satisfied without regard to a warrant so long as there is some

cause for using the beeper.

An en banc§

plurality has held

L"/l ~

that beeper monitoring is acceptable so long as the police have a ~~
"reasonable
Michael,

Th~

United States

suspicion" of criminal activity.

645 F.2d 252

(CAS 1981)

(en bane)

(11-3-10

~I-~

1

-~ -~~ --'~1

v ~~~

decision) ~.,.

has held that monitoring of a beeper on private property

requires a warrant, but that warrantless monitoring of a beeper
located in public

is valid

if the police have probable cause.

United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (CAl 1978).
The motivation underlying
fathom.

these decisions

is

not hard

to

The CAs recognize that beepers are not very intrusive,

but they are unwilling to authorize unlimited beeper use by declaring the Fourth Amendment entirely inapplicable.

In my view,

~

if use of the beeper is to be governed by the Fourth

~

Amendment, the standard presumption in favor a warrant should be

~

however,

~h.4U4.e. ~

applied.
The SG argues

Lo~

that requiring a warrant prior to use of a

beeper would not serve any purpose.

He contends that

::_t::~

place restrictions on monitoring a beeper are impractical,

and

.56-

~

that since the intrusion is slight, any abuse can be controlled
adequately through post-search judicial review.

He also argues

23.
that

requiring

a warrant will

increase the cost and therefore

reduce the effectiveness of using beepers.

Finally, the "princi-

pal cost would be a dilution of the effectiveness of the warrant
procedure

itself,"

because requiring warrants for minor

intru-

sions on Fourth Amendment interests will trivialize the warrant
procedure.
I
the

am not convinced by these arguments.

warrant

drawn.'"
J.)

Brief for US at 39.

requirement

have

been

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

The exceptions to

"'jealously

u.s.

and

carefully

753, 759 (1980)

(Powell,

(quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499

(1958)).

The Court has not held that the limited nature of the intrusion
alone suffices

to excuse the police from obtaining a warrant.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for example, was based on both
the limited intrusion on privacy and the obvious impracticality
of obtaining a warrant prior to a stop and frisk.

-

With respect to bee£ers,
the warrant requirement

is

there is no decent argument that

impractical.

u/

Police use of beepers

almost always will be part of a planned operation.

7I

Securi~~

warrant therefore does not detract from the efficacy of the beeper.

In this case, for example, the police had to obtain the com-

pany's consent to substitute the drum containing the beeper for
the normal container that would have been used.

/~.~

The only thing
)t

saved by not obtaining a warrant was the officer's time.

.

V--t

Time, ~~

~"'
of course, sometimes may be of the essence, but in those circumstances the exigent circumstances doctrine can sustain the warrantless use of a beeper.

If the use of a beeper impinges on

Fourth Amendment interests, as I assume in this section, then the

-.

24.

warrant requirement should apply.

D. Result in this Case
If

the

Court

determines

that

the

warrantless

use of

the

beeper violated resp's Fourth Amendment rights, it might consider
whether his conviction necessarily should be reversed.

Put sim-

The first thing to note is that the situation is only somewhat analogous to Illinois v. Gates.

In both cases the police

obtained and executed a search warrant, and the issue is whether
there was probable cause to support the warrant.

But in Gates

the issue is simply whether there was enough evidence to justify
the warrant; there is no suggestion that the police committed any
illegal

activity.

Here,

in

contrast,

the

warrant

presumably

hinged on the validity of the evidence uncovered through use of
the

beeper.

Therefore,

though

the deterrent

rationale

of

the

exclusionary rule does not apply to the police in Gates, it still

_____.,

may apply here.
One still can make an argument for a good faith exception in
The argument works by analogy to this Court's deci- ~

this case.

sions refusing to apply new Fourth Amendment decisions retroactively.

See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394

(holding that Katz v.
tively only}.
less

use

of

u.s.

244

(1969}

United States should be applied prospec-

If the police in good faith believed that warrantthe

beeper was constitutional,

then

the deterrent

function of the exclusionary rule is sufficiently served by ap-

25.
plying the warrant requirement to cases arising in the future.
At the time of the "beeper search" here it was an open question whether

a warrant was needed.

Several CAs had held that

warrantless use of the beeper was valid in some circumstances.
One can see a problem, however, in applying a good faith standard
to a situation where the CAs were in conflict.

Would warrantless

use of a beeper be in good faith in one circuit but not in another, depending on the holding of the relevant CA?

Certainly the

police reasonably could have been aware of the controversy over
beepers and thus perhaps should have erred on the side of caution
by obtaining a warrant.
case

in

which

to

Thus, I am not sure this would be a good

recognize

or

apply

a

good

faith

exception,

though I think the possibility remains for consideration.

I
~

~
III. Conclusion
Unless the Court is willing to alter its analysis of electronic surveillance devices generally,

I

recommend that the CAS

be reversed.
1. The critical question is whether use of a beeper constiJ(

,,

tutes a search.

4"
t!:

2. Two types of analysis have been used on this question:
(1) what is the nature of the object to which the beeper was attached;

(2)

what was the location of the object when the police

were monitoring the beeper.
3. On the nature of the object, the key distinction is between contraband and lawfully-possessed property.
a.

One might analogize precursor chemicals to contra-

26.

band.
b. It would be difficult, however, to draw a line between lawful property and property that was intended for use in a
crime.
c. Moreover, the issue is not whether there is an ex-

'-------

pectation of privacy in a particular piece of property (i.e., the ~
contraband itself), but whether there is a valid expectation of

?

privacy in a private location, such as resp's residence.
4. On the location of the object, the usual distinction is
between monitoring a beeper in public to assist surveillance and
monitoring a beeper to determine the location of an item on private premises.
a. This distinction is plausible, given that generally
one has a greater expectation of privacy in, say, a private residence than in a car on the public roads.
b. But the distinction does not work well with beepers.

The point of monitoring a beeper is to determine the destination ~
of a

or object.

pe ~ n
-

It should make little difference whether

o_._;,..-

or not the monitoring happens to occur while the beeper moves
onto private property, since the

intrusion on privacy differs

little as between the two situations.
5.

The crucial

issue therefore

becomes whether

use of a

beeper for any purpose of surveillance constitutes a search.
a. The SG makes a strong argument that the beeper merely

enhances

visual

surveillance,

which

does

not

violate

the

Fourth Amendment since a person does not have an expectation of
privacy in his public travels.

This is consistent with Smith v.

17...._

27.
Maryland.
b.

The

countervailing

argument

arises

from

a

belief

that electronic devices are especially pernicious and therefore
should be treated as

intruding on expectations of privacy even

where such expectations are not violated by other forms of surveillance.
c.

I prefer the latter view, believing that the Fourth

Amendment should apply to use of electronic devices that invade
to even a small degree of personal privacy.
d.

My preferred

recent cases.

view,

however,

has

been

rejected

in

Unless the Court is willing to reconsider those

opinions in favor of an approach similar to Justice Harlan's in
dissent in United States v. White, the proper result is that use
of beepers does not constitute a search.
"-----

'\'

/(

6. If use of beepers 1s a search, the remaining question is
......

whether a warrant should be required.
a. Some CAs have held that a warrant is not required,
reasoning that where the intrusion on privacy is minimal a warrant is not necessary.
b. The Court's opinions, however,

suggest that a war-

rant should be required except where there are clear and strong
reasons for making an exception.
c. The police have sufficient opportunity to obtain a
warrant

to

use

________

beepers,

planned
operation.
..__

since

beepers normally are

part

of

a

The SG's argument essentially is that it is

burdensome for the police to obtain a warrant and that this burden is too heavy given the minimal intrusions on privacy.

This

28.

is not sufficient under this Court's precedent.
7. If the warrantless use of the beeper was unconstitutional
in this case, the Court might consider applying a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in order to uphold this conviction.
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The central issue is whether use of a beeper for
any purpose of surveillance constitutes a search.
The SG's Answer:
Use of a beeper merely enchances visual
surveillance, e.g., "tailing" a suspect, using binoculars,
staking out a dwelling.

The SG argues that one has no

expectation of privacy in his public travels.
The SG's position is strongly supported by HAB's
opinion in Smith v. Maryland, sustaining the validity of
placing a "pen register" on one's telephone to identify the
origin of phone calls.

Byron's opinion in United States v.

White (government agents, without a warrant, may listen to
statements made by a suspected person to an informer wearing
a microphone) also supports the SG.

My opinion in Miller,

with respect to bank records, is somewhat supportive.

Warrant Should be Required:
Justice Harlan's dissent in White makes the best
case for a warrant (his famous "Orwellian Big Brother"
concern).

Under the SG's view, there is no limitation on
- ~~fw/+-k~~
the use of beeper ~. Police could, rrl.east arguably, use

~ ~T

beepers on persons or property for any reason and for any )~
length of time.

Unlike other visual means of surveillance

the very efficiency and secrecy of beepers would enable

~

~

2.

government to monitor the movement of persons and their
property far more extensively and secretly.

Possible Middle Grounds:
CAS, plurality en bane in

u.s.

v. Michael (1981)

held that beeper monitoring is acceptable when police have a
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity.

CAl would

require warrantless monitoring by a beeper in public (as
distinguished from a private dwelling) is valid if police
have probable cause.
If, however, the use of beepers is a search (as

~
~
~

Justice Harlan would have held), it is logically difficult
to say that a warrant is not required.

There always will be

close questions of fact as to whether there is

"reasonable ~...-

suspicion" or "probable cause".

,,~

~

The SG argues that obtaining a warrant would be
impractical because of the variations in time and place.
Thus, there could not be the particularized type of warrant
that is required to tap a telephone.

It can be answered

that beepers normally are part of a planned

operation~ It

may not be really burdensome, where police have enough
grounds of suspicion to plan such an operation, to require a
warrant.

Of course, the usual exception with respect to

exigent circumstances would obtain.

~

11

3.

This Case:
Arguably, we might try to apply some sort of "good
faith" exception here as the police probably acted in
perfectly good faith.

In Illinois v. Gates, to be reargued,

the issue is whether there was enough evidence to justify
the warrant, and thus no illegal activity by police.

Here,

in contrast, if a beeper is a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, the deterrent rationale of the
Exclusionary Rule should apply.
In any event, if the Court held that a warrant is
required, the decision should not be made retroactive.

L.F.P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1802

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
LEROY CARLTON KNOTTS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

Jus'}}CE REHNQUIST delivered the Opinion of the Court
A 'beeW! is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated,
which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio
receiver. In this case, a beeper was placed in a five gallon
drum containi~g;hloroform purchased by one of respondent's
codefendants. 'VBy monitoring the progress of a car carrying
the chloroform Minnesota law e
ement agents were able
to trace the can of chlorofo
fro 'ts lace of urchase in
Mi
· , inne§Qta o espondent's secluded cabin near
Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The 1ssue presented by tfiecase is
whetfier suchuse of a beeper violated respondent's rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

I
Respondent and two codefendants were charged in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
with conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances, including but not limited to methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U. S. C. § 846 (1976). One of the codefendants, Darryl
Petschen, was tried jointly with respondent; the other codefendant, Tristan Armstrong, pleaded guilty and testified
for the government at trial.
Suspicion attached to this trio when the 3M Company,
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which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, notified a narcotics
investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been stealing chemicals which could be used in manufacturing illicit
drugs. Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after
leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing
similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in
Minneapolis. The Minnesota narcotics officers observed
that after Armstrong had made a purchase, he would deliver
the chemicals to codefendant Petschen.
With the consent of the Hawkins Chemical Company, officers installed a beeper inside a five gallon container of chloroform, one of the so called "precursor" chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs.
Hawkins agreed that when
Armstrong next purchased chloroform, the chloroform would
be placed in this particular container. When Armstrong
made the purchase, officers followed the car in which the
chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using
both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper.
Armstrong proceeded to Petschen's house, where the container was transferred to Petschen's automobile. Officers
then followed that vehicle eastward towards the state line,
across the St. Croix River, and into Wisconsin. During the
latter part of this journey, Petschen began making evasive
maneuvers, and the pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance. At about the same time officers lost the signal
from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring device located in a helicopter the approximate location of the
signal was picked up again about one hour later. The signal
now was stationary and the location identified was a cabin occupied by respondent near Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The
record before us does not reveal that the beeper was used
after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially
determined.
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Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through
the use of the beeper and additional information obtained
during three days of visual surveillance of respondent's cabin,
officers secured a search warrant. During execution of the
warrant, officers discovered a fully operable, clandestine
drug laboratory in the cabin. In the laboratory area officers
found formulas for amphetamine and methamphetamine,
over $10,000 worth oflaboratory equipment, and chemicals in
quantities sufficient to produce 14 pounds of pure amphetamine. Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the
five gallon container of chloroform.
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent
was convicted for conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846 (1976). He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the monitoring of the
beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its
use had violated respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy, and that all information derived after the location of the
cabin was a fruit of the illegal beeper monitoring.* - - F.
*Respondent does not challenge the warrantless installation of the
beeper in the chloroform container, suggesting in oral argument that he did
not believe he had standing to make such a challenge.
We note that
while several Courts of Appeals have approved warrantless installations,
see United States v. Bernard, 625 F. 2d 854 (CA9 1980); United States v.
Lewis, 621 F. 2d 1382 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 935 (1981);
United States v. Bruneau, 594 F. 2d 1190 (CAS), cert. denied, 444 U. S.
847 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F. 2d 489 (CA9), cert. denied,
439 U. S. 896 (1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569 F. 2d 887 (CA5), cert.
denied, 437 U. S. 907 (1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F. 2d 1153 (CA9
1977), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 910 (1978); United States v. Abel, 548 F. 2d
591 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 956 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539
F. 2d 32 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1002 (1976), we have not before and
do not now pass on the issue. We also note that the government has not,

~
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2d - - (1981). We granted certiorari, - - U. S.
,
(1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
II
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), this
Court held that the wiretapping of a defendant's private telephone line did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
the wiretapping had been effectuated without a physical trespass by the government. Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice
Stone, dissented from that decision, believing that the actions of the government in that case constituted an "unjustifiable intrusion ... upon the privacy of the individual," and
therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. I d. ,~t
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nearly forty years later, · Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the Court ove
ed
Olmstead saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure." 389 U. S., at 353. The Court
said:
"The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance." Id.

In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we elaborated
on the principles stated in Katz:
in this Court, challenged respondent's standing to maintain the Fourth
Amendment claim which he has raised and, therefore, for purposes of this
decision we assume standing.
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"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held
that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends
on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a
'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of
privacy' that has been invaded by government action.
[Citations omitted]. This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan
aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces
two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy,' 389 U. S., at 361-whether, in
the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown
that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' !d.,
at 351. The second question is whether the individual's
subjective expectation of privacy is 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' id., at 361whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable'
under the circumstances. !d., at 353. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S., at 143--144, n. 12; id., at 151 (concurring opinion); United States v. White, 401 U. S., at 752
(plurality opinion)." 442 U. S., at 740-741 (footnote
omitted).
The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the
beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an
automobile on public streets and highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile:
~sser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality). See also
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/,_as v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 153-154, and n. 2 (1978)
v{p~~ELL, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 u. s. 364, 368 (1976).
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When Petschen travelled
over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever
stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property. Visual surveillance from public places along his route would have sufficed to reveal these facts to the police. The fact that the
officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but
on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen's
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at
birth with such enhancement as science and technology may
afford. In United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927), the
Court said:
"But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain shows that he used a searchlight.
It is not shown that there was any exploration below
decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the
cases of liquor were on deck and, like the defendants,
were discovered before the motor boat was boarded.
Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a
marine glass or a field .glass. It is not prohibited by the
Constitution." I d., at 563.
We have recently had occasion to deal with another claim
which was to some extent a factual counterpart of respondent's assertions here. In Smith v. Maryland, supra, we
said:
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"This analysis dictates that [Smith] can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here. When he used his
phone, [Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
The switching equipment that processed those numbers
is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in
an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. [Smith] concedes that if he had placed his calls
through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. [Citation omitted]. We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone company has decided to
automate." 442 U. S., at 744-745.
Respondent does not actually quarrel with this analysis,
though he expresses the generalized view that the result of
the holding sought by the government would be that
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country
will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision."
Br. for Resp., at 9 (footnote omitted). But the fact is that
the "reality hardly suggests abuse," Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 566 (1978); respondent was ·not just
"any citizen," and if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable. I d. Insofar as respondent's complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more
effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional
foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.
Respondent specifically attacks the use of the beeper insofar as it was used to determine that the can of chloroform had
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come to rest on his property at Shell Lake, Wisconsin. He
repeatedly challenges the "use of the beeper to determine the
location of the chemical drum at Respondent's premises," Br.
for Resp., at 26; he states that "[t]he government thus overlooks the fact that this case involves the sanctity of Respondent's residence, which is accorded the greatest protection
available under the Fourth Amendment." I d. The Court of
Appeals appears to have rested its decision on this ground:
"As noted above, a principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of beepers, particularly beepers in or
on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more effective
means of observing what is already public. But people
pass daily from public to private spheres. When police
agents track bugged personal property without first obtaining a warrant, they must do so at the risk that this
enhanced surveillance, intrusive at best, might push fortuitously and unreasonably into the private sphere protected by the Fourth Amendment." Pet., at 6a.
We think that respondent's contentions, and the above
quoted language from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to
some extent lose sight of the limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper. As we
have noted, nothing in this record indicates that the beeper
signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that
the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive
journey at rest on respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin.
Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance,
the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case
to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when
they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely
on their naked eyes. But scientific enhancement of this sort
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance
would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a
distance throughout his journey could have observed him
leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned
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by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car.
This fact, along with others, was used by the government in
obtaining a search warrant which led to the discovery of the
clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no indication that
the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to
the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way
that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Just as notions of physical trespass based on
the law of real property were not dispositive in Katz, supra,
neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United States, 265

u. s. 57 (1924).

We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of
our inquiry in discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the
beeper signals complained of by respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? For the reasons
previously stated, we hold they did not. Since they did not,
there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
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January 13, 1983

Re:

81-1802 - United States v. Knotts

Dear Bill:
While I agree with your conclusion, I am inclined
to think that some of the statements in your opinion
are broader than necessary. Let me identify those that
trouble me.
On page 6, you state that a person travelling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has "no"
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another. It seems to me that that
statement is somewhat exaggerated. When one of us
takes his family on a vacation, leaving early in the
morning for an unannounced destination, I think we do
not expect the general public to know where we are
going or why. The fact that a detective might
successfully follow us without our knowledge does not,
it seems to me, totally foreclose· the expectation that
a private vacation would normally be a private matter.
Later on page 6, you state that nothing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from augmenting
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology may afford.
But if sophisticated listening devices would enable
officers to overhear private conversations that take
place within an automobile, it seems rather clear that
the Fourth Amendment might be violated.
Indeed, isn't
that what Katz holds?
On page 7, you suggest that respondent was not
just "any citizen," but I should have thought he was
entitled to the protections of any other citizen until
the police had probable cause to conduct a search.
Toward the bottom of page 7, you make the
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IJIH-j ~r; ;ttJ ~ ~. ~ ':i-t.~

JfJ'~=;;iJ: ~ ~ ~y~

that the

-2-

of scientific devices to make the police more effective
in detecting crime does not give rise to any
constitutional problem. Again, as in the case of
sophisticated listening devices, I do not believe I can
agree.
(There is a similar overstatement toward the
bottom of page 8 about "scientific enhancement" raising
no constitutional issues that visual surveillance would
not also raise.)
Finally, in your concluding sentence you state
that there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure." It
would seem to me that the more correct analysis is that
even if surveillance, whether visual or electronic,
constitutes a search, the intrusion associated with
following a car on the public roads is virtually always
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In this case I would say that even if there may have
been a search--after all, the police did spend about an
hour trying to locate the missing car--that it was
perfectly reasonable, especially since there is no
question about the legitimacy of the installation of
the beeper itself.
Respectfully,

~

Justice Rehnquist
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Dear John:
I agree with some of your observations with respect to
the circulating opinion in this case, atid disagree with
others.
Insofar as your example of a family leaving for a
vacation in a car which is driven on a public thoroughfare,
I stand by the statement in the circulating draft that there
is no reasonable expectation of priv~cy in their movements
along the highway.
I agree that any citizen, whether Knotts or anyone
else, is entitled to the protections of the Fourth
·
Amendment; but insofar as travel in a licensed vehicle along
a public highway is concerned, I do not think that he or any
citizen suffers any deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights
when he is visually observed by the police.

•
"·

I agree with your suggestion that the language which
you refer to on page 6 might be taken to reach devices which
would enable officers to overhear private conversations that
take place within an automobile, though it is certainly not
intended to pass judgment on such devices. Accordingly, I
will change the sentence beginning "Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment" on page 6 so as to read:
"Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties

.
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- 2 bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them in this
case."
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the circulating opinion in this case, and disagree with
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Insofar as your example of a family leaving for a
vacation in a car which is driven on a public thoroughfare,
I stand by the statement in the circulating draft that there
is no reasonable expectation of priv~cy in their movements
along the highway.

•

I agree that any citizen, whether Knotts or anyone
else, is entitled to the protections of the Fourth
·
Amendment; but insofar as travel in a licensed vehicle along
a public highway is concerned, I do not think that he or any
citizen suffers any deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights
when he is visually observed by the police.
I agree with your suggestion that the language which
you refer to on page 6 might be taken to reach devices which
would enable officers to overhear private conversations that
take place within an automobile, though it is certainly not
intended to pass judgment on such devices. Accordingly, I
will change the sentence beginning "Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment" on page 6 so as to read:
"Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties
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bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them in this
case."
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Dear Bill:
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/
Re:

No. 81-1802 - United States v. Knotts

Dear Bill:
I would like very much to be able to join your opinion.
I am certainly with you in the judgment. One thing, however,
bothers me.
On page 6, first full paragraph, next to the
last line, could you see your way clear to end the sentence
with the word "cabin" and eliminate the citation of the
Hester case?
I do not regard the Knotts case as an open fields one.
Further, we shall probably take an open fields case for argument, and I, for one, am a little reluctant to lay the ground
work here for a decision in whatever case we take.
Hester,
of course, is also cited on page 9 of your opinion.
I wish
we could eliminate that citation, too.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

~u.prttttt

<!Jl11trl cf flrt ~b $5Wt.s
..rutfri:ngl:cl419. <!J. 2ll~Jl.~

CHAMBER S O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

January 18, 1983

Re:

No.

81-1802

United States v. Knotts

Dear Bill:
You have probably seen my letter to Harry, responding to a
request similar to that contained in your letter of January 17th.
The only reason I voted to grant certiorari in Florida v. Brady,
which was an opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida expressing
the view that United States v. Hester was no longer the law,
was because I felt there was no warrant in this Court's cases
for the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Florida.
The present draft of my opinion in this case conforms to what
I believe to be the state of the law on this subject.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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RE:

January 25, 1983

No. 81-1802 United States v. Knotts

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your concurring in the judgment
in the above.
Sincerely,

/M

'

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

January 25, 1983

No. 81-1802 United States v. Knotts

Dear John:
Please join me in your concurrence in the above.

Sincerely,

/3-uJ
Justice Stevens '
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

February 9, 1983

No. 81-1802 - United States v. Knotts

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

~uFttttt

<!Jom! d

tl{t~tw ;§hdt.tr

1fag!rington. ~. <!}. 20.?)!.~
CHAMBERS OF"
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February 18, 1983

Re:

81-1802 - United

Stat~s

v, Knotts

Dear Harry:
Please join me,
Respectfully,

J~
Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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